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Abstract
Assuming that teachers are concerned with human capital formation and stu-
dents  with ability signaling, in this paper we model a teacher-student relationship
as an agency problem with conicting interests. In our model, the teacher elicits
e¤ort from the student rewarding for it with a grade, the utility of which to the
student is an ability signal inferred by the job market. In the event that the job
market does not observe individual teachersgrading practice, teachers nd grades
as costless rewards and optimally choose to be lenient in grading. As a result,
the problem of the commonsof good grades emerges leading to the depreciation
of grading standards and grade ination. The prediction of the model that the
lower the expectations the teacher holds about her studentsabilities, the atter
the grading rules she sets up is empirically supported.
Keywords: Principal-agent model, teacher-student relationship, costless rewards,
grading rules, mismatch of abilities and grades, grade ination, teacher incentives.
JEL codes: C70, D82, D86, I20.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we approach a teacher-student relationship as a principal-agent model with
conicting interests. Arguably, a teachers goal is to pass on knowledge to students the
more, the better while the students care for the teachers assessment of their performance
grades. A justication of this conict of interests could be the dichotomy of the role of
education: human capital formation versus job market signaling.1 Therefore, an interpre-
tation of our modeling framework to be presented is that the teacher is more concerned
with the human capital formation side, while the students with the ability signaltheir
I would like to thank Tore Ellingsen, Christian Ewerhart, Drew Fudenberg, Magnus Johannesson,
Karl Wärneryd, and seminar participants at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
yUniversity of Zurich, IEW, Winterthurerstrasse 30, CH8006 Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail: rober-
tas.zubrickas@uzh.ch.
1See, e.g., Bedard (2001).
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accomplished education carries along, treating knowledge obtained as abstract and use-
less outside academia. We are going to show that the grading patterns widely observed in
practice a mismatch or low correlation between studentsgrades and their abilities and
coarse grading with implications to grade ination can be the outcomes of our agency
problem, as studied from an individual teachers perspective.
We consider a grading rule assigning grades to exam scores as a contract that
the teacher o¤ers her student. With the help of grades, the teacher aims to elicit costly
learning e¤ort from equivalently, to pass on knowledge to her student, who comes from
a population of students with disparate abilities for the subject taught. The teacher has
a technology the exam test that allows her to assess the students knowledge level
attained, on which she conditions grades to be rewarded. We assume that a knowledge
level attained is in a direct and deterministic relationship with the students learning
e¤ort elicited (conditional on his ability type). The main constraint that we impose on
the teacher is that her grading rule needs to be incentive compatible, i.e., grades cannot
be conditioned on the students ability level, which is his private information.2
The key feature of this model is that grades are costless rewards for the teacher to
give but of a value to the student. We separately consider two sources of value of grades
to the student: 1) nominal a grade is of a value on its own and 2) relative the value
of a grade comes in the form of an ability signal inferred by the job market. The latter
interpretation of the value of grades is in the tradition of treating education as job market
signaling (Spence (1973)), but the former is not a big departure from this tradition either.
A student may care for his grade at every class he takes not just because of its immediate
job-market-signaling value but for its contribution toward his nal grade average at the
end of his study program, which later on will serve as an ability signal. Besides, external
criteria of academic performance used, e.g., for scholarship application purposes are
usually set in nominal grades.
The main distinction between the two approaches to modeling the utility of grades
can be expressed in terms of the scarcity of grades available to the teacher. In the rst
case, the (ex ante) utility of a grade is independent of the frequency of the grade given
in the class i.e., there is no scarcity of grades while in the second case, where the
utility of a grade is equal to the expected ability inferred by the job market, grades
are scarce. However, the two approaches turn similar if we assume that the job market
cannot identify the teachers grading rule applied to grade the student and infers the
students ability from his grade based on its own perception of grading standards. Then,
2If a hidden-information framework seems restrictive arguably, teachers have access to students
previous records and can learn about their abilities then, alternatively, we could require that the teacher
cannot discriminate among her students by applying ability-specic grading rules (i.e., the same exam
score needs to result in the same grade irrespective of the students ability level). With this alternative
formulation, the optimization problem would remain intact as in the case with the hidden-information
framework adopted, and, therefore, the latter is retained for its link with the existing literature.
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the teacher essentially nds grades as costless and abundant rewards to give (but with
implications to the deterioration of grading standards as later discussed).3
All in all, we study a teacher-student relationship in the framework of a single-agent
model with hidden information. With the assumption that the teachers objective is to
maximize the students expected knowledge under the incentive compatibility constraint,
the goal of this paper is to analyze the properties of the grading rule optimallydesigned
by the teacher.
We obtain the following predictions about optimal grading patterns. In the event
when students value grades nominally, we observe the teacher pooling student ability
types for the highest grade. In other words and more generally, the no distortion at the
topproperty does not hold when the teacher (principal) can costlessly reward the student
(agent). This result arises because the gain from distorting incentives for students of the
highest ability outweighs the corresponding loss (unlike in the standard model with costly
transfers). For the case with the relative value of grades, if the students learning costs
are not too high (i.e., the e¤ort cost function is not too convex), then the teacher designs
a grading rule that perfectly screens student ability types.4 However, if the teachers
grading rule cannot be distinguished by the job market, we again obtain pooling student
types for the highest grade (for the same reasons as in the model with nominal grades). In
addition, our comparative statics analysis shows that if the teacher holds low expectations
about her studentsabilities, then she should apply more lenient grading standards (in
order to elicit on average higher e¤ort levels), and vice versa. As a result, this can lead
to heterogeneous distributions of grades among classes di¤erent in student abilities in
particular, to a mismatch and low correlation between studentsgrades and their abilities.
Signicantly, the existing empirical evidence strongly supports the ndings of the
model, lending credibility to our chosen modeling strategy of a teacher-student relation-
ship. With regard to our comparative statics result, Goldman & Widawski (1976) report
a negative correlation between studentsScholastic Aptitude Test scores (which could be
seen as a proxy measure of studentsabilities) and the grading standards in the classes
the students were majoring in. According to this study (conducted at University of Cal-
ifornia, Riverside), the negative correlation observed is due to the fact that professors in
a eld consisting of students with high abilities tend to grade more stringently than do
professors in a eld with lower-ability students precisely as our model predicts. These
empirical ndings were conrmed by similar studies conducted at Dartmouth College
(Strenta & Elliott (1987)) and at Duke University (Johnson (2003)). Later in the text,
3In our model, the student is indi¤erent about the resultant distribution of grades in the class and,
accordingly, his class ranking as long as it does not a¤ect the ability-signaling value of his grade. We
do not model that the (ex ante) utility of a grade may also come in the form of status or class ranking,
unlike in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2009), a related paper discussed later, Moldovanu et al. (2007), or
Besley & Ghatak (2008).
4This result is in line with the results from related models modeling non-pecuniary rewards such as
status incentives; see Moldovanu et al. (2007); Besley & Ghatak (2008).
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we discuss this empirical evidence more thoroughly.
Our model can also o¤er an insight into the grade ination phenomenon an ongoing
rise in grade point averages without an accompanying rise in student ability or e¤ort.5If
we take a dynamic perspective that over time, due to an increasing number of university
openings available (McKenzie & Tullock (1981)), the distribution for abilities of students
enrolled become gradually skewed to the end of lower-ability types6, then, according to our
model with nominal grades, the teacher should become more lenient with grading. The
reason for it is to extract more e¤ort from increasingly numerous lower-ability types (even
at the expense of distorting incentives for high-ability students even further). Along the
same lines, with the number of educational institutions increasing, an individual teachers
grading practice bears an increasingly smaller weight on the job markets perception of
grades as ability signals. Then, similarly to the case with nominal grades, in the model
with relative grades teachers may nd grades to be costless rewards to give and tend to
exploit good grades to their benet. As a result, the problem of the commonsof good
grades arises, which leads to the deterioration of grading standards and grade ination in
the end. Hence, we argue that grade ination can arise from teachersoptimal response
to changes in the environment they work at.7
The key driver of our results obtained is the costlessness of rewards. The proposed
renement that, unlike the agent, the principal is indi¤erent to a transfer between them is
by no means new in the contract theory literature. It was formally studied, for example,
in Guesnerie & La¤ont (1984), one of the founding articles on mechanism design aimed
at providing an all-encompassing solution to a broadly dened principal-agent problem.
In particular, they distinguish between type Aand type Bpreferences, where with
the former preferences the principals utility does not depend on a transfer, while with
the latter (conventional) preferences it does. In their study, however, the type A
preferences are primarily used to analyze a social planners problem of social welfare
maximization. There, a transfer between the social planner (principal) and the agent is
equivalent, guratively speaking, to distributing money between two pockets of the same
jacket, leaving the social welfare intact. Therefore, the framework of Guesnerie & La¤ont
(1984) does not apply to the problem studied here. In our model, the principal is, in
fact, more of type B, i.e., she cares only about her own utility but does not pay for
5Dickson (1984). For more on grade ination, see, e.g., Sabot & Wakeman-Linn (1991) or Kuh & Hu
(1999) and other references cited therein.
6 ... which is consistent with the observation of declining college entrance test scores (Wilson (1999)).
7The recent papers by Chan et al. (2007) and Ostrovsky & Schwarz (Forthcoming) also show how
grade ination can arise in equilibrium. These papers model student grading as a signaling (cheap-talk)
game between schools and the job market, and they show that grade compression (and, accordingly, grade
ination) can be an equilibrium disclosure of information by schools about their studentsabilities that
maximizes their expected wages (unlike expected learning e¤ort as in our model). However, these papers
do not attempt to explain the other empirical observation about grading patterns discussed, namely, the
low correlation between studentsgrades and their abilities. Later in the paper, we use their argument
when discussing policy applications of restricting grading rules applied by teachers.
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motivating the agent.
Nor does this paper stand alone in designing optimal grading rules from the perspec-
tive of a principal-agent model.8 Dubey & Geanakoplos (2009) target the question what
grading scale (ner or coarser) a teacher should use in order to induce a higher e¤ort from
her students. They approach the problem of optimal grading schemes from a perspective
di¤erent from ours: they model a teacher-student relationship as a game of status with
stochastic output similar to a tournament. In their multiple-agent model, a students
utility of a grade depends on his or her class ranking, i.e., status, resulting from the
grade rewarded (but not on a grade per se even if a grade carries the same ability signal
irrespective of distribution for grades in the class). In addition, in their model the teacher
aims to incentivize all her students to put in maximal e¤ort rather than to obtain the
highest expected e¤ort. Given these modeling di¤erences, we draw di¤erent conclusions
about optimal grading schemes. Dubey & Geanakoplos (2009) nd that teachers should
use coarse grading schemes and pyramidthe allocation of grades: in equilibrium the
highest grade would be available to fewer students than the second-highest grade, and
so on.9 Our model predicts that teachers should apply coarse grading schemes, but only
when they can costlesslyreward the student (e.g., when an individual teachers grading
practice cannot a¤ect the perception of the job market about the value of grades), other-
wise they should apply a ne grading rule. In addition, in the case with costless grades,
we do not nd pyramidingto be an optimal grading rule, especially, when there is a
large mass of less able students in the class.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a
modeling framework. In Section 3, we solve the model for the case when students value
grades nominally, and in Section 4 for the case with the relative value of grades. In
Section 5, we discuss the main ndings of the model(s) presented and relate them to
the grading patterns observed in practice; there, we also discuss policy applications of
the model(s). In Section 6, we review existing empirical evidence on mismatch between
studentsgrades and their abilities. The last section concludes the study.
2 Framework
There is a teacher teaching her class, made of one student, a particular subject. The
teachers goal is to pass on knowledge in her subject to the student . She has a technology
the exam test that allows her to assess the students knowledge level attained from his
8However, it needs to be reckoned that not much theoretical work has been done on modeling a teacher-
student relationship as a principal-agent model on its own, whereas this relationship has typically been
modeled as part of a more global game involving potential employers or university administration (see
Ostrovsky & Schwarz (Forthcoming) or Chan et al. (2007)). At the same time, more research has been
done on the empirical side of the problem (see Johnson (2003)).
9Moldovanu et al. (2007) makes a similar prediction as well.
5
test score x 2 [0; x]. (The upper bound on test scores, x, is large enough to allow for an
interior solution.) We assume that the teachers technology is perfect in the sense that
there is a deterministic and direct relationship between test scores and knowledge levels,
both of which, therefore, are used synonymously throughout. Achieving a test score x
comes to the student at the e¤ort cost of C(x; ), where parameter  is the students pri-
vately known ability level for the subject studied, distributed in the population according
to a common prior distribution F over the ability space  =

; 

,  >  > 0. The
properties of the e¤ort cost function C are Cx > 0; Cxx > 0; C < 0, and Cx < 0.
The student selects the class for exogenous reasons (e.g., it is compulsory in his cur-
riculum). The reward pursued by the student from participating in the class is the
teachers assessment, grade r 2 [0; r], of his class performance knowledge attained. The
upper bound on grades, r, is assumed to be institutionally preset, as is the very grad-
ing framework, i.e., the assessment of student performance needs to done in the form of
grades only. As already said in the introduction, we separately consider two sources of
value of grades to the student: 1) a grade is of a value on its own (Section 3. Nominal
Value of Grades) and 2) the value of a grade comes in the form of an ability signal as
inferred by the job market (Section 4. Relative Value of Grades). The exact forms of the
students utility function of a grade are given in the corresponding sections.
The teacher and students relationship develops as follows. First, the teacher sets up
a grading rule that assigns grades r to test scores x. Then, after observing the grading
rule, the student decides on a learning e¤ort C(x; ) to achieve the test score x rewarding
the grade r. The teachers objective is to maximize her expected utility, which increases
in the students knowledge equivalently, in his test score and the students objective
is to maximize his utility of a grade less the e¤ort cost spent to obtain it.
Here, we impose some further structure on the model. The cumulative ability distri-
bution function F is twice di¤erentiable and its probability density function f is strictly
positive everywhere (f > 0). In addition, we impose the assumption that the hazard
rate, h() = f()=(1   F ()), monotonically increases in ability, i.e., h0()  0. The
students e¤ort cost function C is separable in test score x and ability  and takes the
form of C(x; ) = y(x)=, where y is an increasing and strictly convex function of x.
Then, denote the teachers utility of test score x elicited from the student by function
V : [0; x]! R+, Vx > 0, and assume, until further notice, that it is linear in x :
V (x) = x: (1)
The teachers linear utility can be interpreted that she equally cares about the per-
formance of low- and high-ability students. Later in the text, when discussing policy
applications of the model , the linear case serves as a benchmark for the cases when 1)
function V is convex (the teacher puts more weight on high-ability students), and 2)
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function V is concave (the teacher puts more weight on low-ability students).
Next, when formulating the teachers utility maximization problem designing the
student-knowledge-maximizing grading rule we, without loss of generality, restrict the
set of grading rules to direct grading rulesm = fx; rg, where test score schedule x : !
[0; x] and grade schedule r :  ! [0; r] impose on the student the truthful revelation of
own ability type. Furthermore, we impose that functions x and r belong to the class
of piecewise continuously di¤erentiable functions (piecewise C1), which also need to be
non-decreasing for a grading rule fx; rg to be implementable. Given these restrictions on
x and r, denote the families of these functions by C1x and C1r , respectively.
3 Nominal Value of Grades
In this section, we model that the student values grades at their face value and derives
a higher utility from a higher grade independently of the grading rule applied by the
teacher. Given a grading rule fx; rg, the students net utility of reporting a type ^ is
equal to
U(; ^) = r(^)  C(x(^); ); (2)
where parameter  is the students ability type. The students reservation utility of
participating in the class is normalized to zero (for all ability types).
3.1 The Teachers Problem
The teacher maximizes with respect to a grading rule fx; rg 2 C1x  C1r her expected
utility Z 

x()dF () (3)
subject to
U(; )  U(; ^); (4)
U(; )  0; (5)
0 < r()  r; for all  and ^ in : (6)
In the above, (4) is the students incentive compatibility constraint, (5)  the individual
rationality constraint, where the function U is dened in (2); the last constraint imposes
an upper bound on the teachers rewards (though already imposed by requiring r 2 C1r ).
Under this specication, the model resembles a standard static principal-agent model
with hidden information except for the transfer structure. The distinct feature of this
model is that, unlike in most agency models, the transfer function r does not enter the
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principals (teachers) utility function but only the agents (students), meaning that the
principal does not payto motivate the agent. In other words, rewards are costless to
give for the principal but of a value to the agent.
Therefore, unlike in models with monetary transfers, in this model with costless re-
wards we do not have the intercomparison of the agents and principals utilities. To solve
the model, we approach it di¤erently from the standard solution method attributable to
Mirrlees (1971), which main idea is to obtain a functional equation with one unknown
by merging the agents and principals optimization problems through the transfer func-
tion. The key element in solving our model is the observation that it must be optimal
for the principal to reward the highest grade of r to the most e¢ cient agent, i.e., in the
solution r() = r, because the reward is costless. This observation allows us to reduce all
the constraints (4)(6) into a single constraint and solve the model using the standard
Langragean methods.
3.2 Solution
We present the solution, the grading rule fx; rg maximizing (3) subject to (4)(6), in
Proposition 1 below, relegating the details of solving the model to the Appendix. The
main property of the solution is the pooling of ability types from a non-empty interval
; 

for the highest score-grade allocation, which we discuss more thoroughly later.
Proposition 1 The score-grade allocations (x(); r()), solving the optimization problem
(3)(6), are characterized
 for ability types  in [; ), where
 = minf : (1  F ())=(f())  1;  2 ; g; (7)
by
x() = y 1x

f()2yx(x(
))
f()2

(8)
for the score allocations x, and by
r() = C(x(); ) 
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~ (9)
for the grade allocations r;
 for ability types  in ;  by the grade r() = r and the score allocation x() =
x(), where x() is found from
r   C(x(); ) +
Z 

C(x(); )d = 0: (10)
8
Proof. See Appendix A.10
3.3 Results
Below we summarize the main properties of the optimal grading rule with nominal grades,
presented in Proposition 1.
3.3.1 Pooling at the top
To make it general, one of the main properties of the model studied is the optimality of
uniform allocations among most e¢ cient agent types when the principal does not bear or
does not internalize the cost of rewarding the agent. This result is in sharp contrast to
the no distortion at the topproperty of optimal contracts in most agency models with
costly rewards and hidden information.11
Result 1 In a single-agent and hidden-information agency problem with costless rewards,
the principal pools some of the most e¢ cient agent types for a uniform allocation.
The proof of this result has been given when deriving the condition for the starting point
of the pooling interval (7) in Proposition 1 (see Appendix A), where we showed that a
uniform score-grade allocation (x(); r) applies to all the agent types from the non-empty
interval

; 

(the starting point  is bound to be strictly less than the highest ability
type , since (1   F ())=(f()) = 0 < 1). Moreover, neither the existence of an upper
bound on rewards nor its size, as imposed by constraint (6), is central to the result, what
is crucial is the costlessness of rewards. (In a principal-agent model with costly rewards,
imposing an upper bound on the reward function does not lead to pooling among the
most e¢ cient agent types as long as this constraint is not binding, i.e., when the upper
bound is large enough.)
The nding that there is no perfect screening among the most e¢ cient agent types
should not be surprising. Suppose it were the case that in the solution only the most
e¢ cient type received the highest reward. To make this allocation incentive compatible,
the principal would need to suppress the motivation of other types in order to refrain the
most e¢ cient type from misreporting. But, as an alternative to the perfect screening,
consider the principal marginally tilting up the schedule of all the allocations but
10The problem is solved for the case with the linear utility function V . However, this has no e¤ect
on the qualitative properties of the solution obtained, which are invariant to the form of the teachers
utility function V (which needs to be less convexthan the e¤ort cost function C). In particular, the
starting point of the pooling interval  remains the same for any functional form of V .
11While the no distortion at the topproperty is characteristic of principal-agent models with mone-
tary rewards, see, e.g., Mirrlees (1971) , it has also been shown to hold for agency problems with status
incentives, see Moldovanu et al. (2007). (Recently, there have also been papers in which this property
does not hold in the optimum, see Levin (2003) or MacLeod (2003), where the result hinges on the
assumption that the agents e¤ort is not veriable unlike in our model.)
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the last one done at no cost against the corresponding decrease in the performance
allocation of the most e¢ cient agent type. This change in the allocations is sure to be
expected performance increasing because the gain from it the increases in performance
levels for almost all types outweighs its corresponding loss the decrease in performance
level of the most e¢ cient type happening with a very small probability. As a result, the
principal nds it optimal to increase the probability mass of agent types subject to the
highest reward until the gains and losses described o¤set each other.
Referring back to the teacher-student relationship, where lenient grading is a wide-
spread phenomenon, pooling most e¢ cient types is even more prevalent when the distri-
bution for abilities is more skewed to the end of low types as discussed next.
3.3.2 Mismatch between grades and abilities
Here, we establish a relationship between the optimal grading rule and student ability
distribution, which has a strong empirical support from the literature on educational
measurement, described later in the paper.
Consider two classes of students, who come from two di¤erent student populations,
where abilities are distributed on the same support  according to distributions F1 and
F2, respectively. Denote the student types from the two classes by 1 and 2, respectively,
and let the student type 2 be smaller than 1 in the likelihood ratio order, i.e.,
f2()
f1()
decreases for all  in ,
where f1 and f2 are the probability density functions of the corresponding distributions.
The interpretation of this stochastic dominance condition is that students from the rst
class are held more able than those from the second class. (Formally, this condition implies
that
R 00
0 f1()d 
R 00
0 f2()d for any interval [
0; 00]  , or for any restriction of
the ability space the expected student ability in the rst class is greater than that in the
second class.)
Let fx1; r1g and fx2; r2g be the solutions to the optimization problem (3)(6) for the
two classes, respectively. Then, the following holds.
Result 2 If the student type 2 is smaller than the student type 1 in the likelihood ratio
order, then the optimal grade allocations in the two classes satisfy r2()  r1() for every
student type  in .
Proof. See Appendix B.
To put it in words, this result says that the lower the expectations the teacher holds
about her student abilities, the more lenient she should be when grading. The intuition
behind the optimality of more lenient grading rules in less able classes comes from the
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teachers attempt to extract more e¤ort from more numerous lower-ability student types,
and vice versa.
Results 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 1. It depicts the optimal grading rules for two
classes with the student ability type space  = [0:5; 1:5]; the student ability in the rst
class, 1, is distributed according to the distribution with f1() = ,  2 , and in the
second class, the student ability 2 is distributed uniformly over  (the top diagram). The
e¤ort cost function takes the form of C(x; ) = x2=(2) and the upper bound on grades
is set to r = 1. The middle diagram of Figure 1 shows the optimal score allocations (the
dashed line for the rst class and the dotted line for the second class), and the bottom
diagram shows the optimal grade allocations for the two classes, respectively. As we can
see, both teachers pool some of the most e¢ cient student types. The teacher of the rst
class, however, o¤ers the highest grade of r to fewer student types but against a higher
performance level, while the teacher of the second class optimally chooses to be more
lenient. Unlike the teacher of the more able class, the second teacher also o¤ers a atter
score-grade schedule in her attempt to extract more e¤ort from less able but relatively
more numerous student types.
4 Relative Grades
In this section, we study the situation when the student values a grade only for its value
as an ability signal to the job market. In what follows, we distinguish between two cases
based on the scope of the markets knowledge: 1) distinguishable grading rules the job
market observes the grading rule applied to grade the student and 2) indistinguishable
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grading rules the job market does not observe the exact grading rule applied to grade the
student and infers the students expected ability from a grade based on its own perception
of grading standards applied.
4.1 Distinguishable Grading Rules
Here, we modify the previous model by having that 1) the student values a grade for
its ability signal, and 2) the job market observes the grading rule set up by the teacher
and correctly infers the students (expected) ability from his grade, as dened below.
Therefore, unlike in the previous section, here the value of a grade is dependent on the
distribution of grades across di¤erent ability types or, in other words, on the stringency
of the grading rule applied by the teacher.
Suppose the teacher designs a grading rule m = fx; rg. Let R(r) denote the range of
the grade schedule r. If r 2 R(r), r 1(r) is the set of all  2  such that r() = r. Let
(r) = inf(r 1(r)) and 
(r) = sup(r 1(r)). Using the monotonicity of grade schedule
r, we dene the ability type r inferred by the job market from a grade r, r : [0; r]! ,
by
r(r) =
8>><>>:
r 1(r) if r 2 R(r) and (r) = (r);R (r)
(r) f()d()
F ((r)) F ((r)) if r 2 R(r) and (r) 6= (r);
0 if r =2 R(r).
(11)
As a technical detail, we set r(r) = 0 if r =2 R(r) to mean that if the students grade is
outside the range of grades observed then this grade as a signal is meaningless.
The above denition also denes the students utility of a grade given the grading
rule m = fx; rg, and his net utility of reporting a type ^ is equal to
U r(; ^) = r(r(^))  C(x(^); ): (12)
The teachers problem
As before, the teachers problem is to set up a grading rule that elicits from the student
the highest expected performance on the test, i.e., the teacher maximizes her expected
utility with respect to a grading rule m = fx; rg 2 C1x  C1rZ 

x()dF () (13)
subject to
U r(; )  U r(; ^); (14)
U r(; )  0; for all  and ^ in . (15)
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In the above, the constraints are the students incentive compatibility constraint to report
truthfully and individual rationality constraint, respectively, where the students utility
function U r is dened in (12), and r, the ability signal for the job market, is dened by
(11).
In this version of the model, we can simplify the teachers problem (13)(15) by
making it be maximized with respect to a score schedule x only. The reason for this
is that a grade does not bear any value on its own and, as a result, a score schedule x
can be implemented by any grade schedule r isomorphic to x achieving the same utility
levels. Therefore, without loss of generality, in the teachers problem we restrict the set
of grading rules C1x  C1r to such grading rules m = fx; rg, where the grade schedule r
takes the form of
r() = r
x()
x()
; for any  2 : (16)
All in all, the teacher maximizes (13) with respect to x 2 C1x subject to (14) and (15)
with the grade schedule r imposed by (16).
Solution
If the student values a grade for its ability signal, the teacher, when designing a grading
rule, needs to take into account the e¤ect the grading rule itself has on the value of a
grade for the student as determined by (11). Unlike in the previous model with nominal
grades, it follows that the more lenient the grading rule the teacher sets up, the lower the
utility the student gets from a given grade, adversely a¤ecting his learning e¤ort choice
decision. Below, we give a condition when the downside e¤ect of leniency in grading the
job markets degradingof studentsgrades outweighs the upside e¤ect, which is more
e¤ort extraction from lower ability types.
First, we solve for the optimal score schedule x under the conjecture that the teacher
perfectly screens all the types.
Conjecture 1 The grading rule m solving the teachers problem (13)(16) screens every
ability type  distinctly.
As it follows from the conjecture, we need to consider only strictly monotone piecewise
C1 performance functions x. Then, the solution to the teachers problem is uniquely
characterized by the students constraints (14) and (15) only. Given a score schedule x,
with the grade schedule r imposed by (16), the utility to the student of ability  from
reporting being a type ^ is given by
U r(; ^) = ^   y(x(^))

;
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and, at a point of di¤erentiability, the incentive compatibility constraint implies that
@
@^
U r(; ) = 0;
or
yx(x())x() = :
Next, it has to be that the individual rationality constraint of the lowest ability type 
needs to be binding (or, more precisely, that of the least e¢ cient type contracted upon
by the teacher, which we assume to be ). If there are no discontinuities which we check
if it is the case later the solution to the above di¤erential equation together with the
binding individual rationality constraint is
x() = y 1

2 + 2
2

; (17)
for every  in . The second-order condition for (17) to be the solution holds. Further-
more, since the derivative of x in (17) is positive for every type , the constraint that x
be monotone also holds.
But suppose that there are (simple) discontinuities in the score schedule x that solve
the teachers problem. Denote the discontinuity point closest to the type  by 0, and
let x(0 ) 6= x(0), where x(0 ) is a left-hand limit (the subsequent argument with
straightforward alterations also holds for the case x(0+) = x(0), where x(0+) is a
right-hand limit). Then, (17) holds only for types  in [; 0). But the allocation x(0)
cannot be greater than the allocation determined by (17) for  = 0, because x(0) would
not be incentive compatible: we could nd a type ~ 2 [; 0) such that U r(0; ^) > U r(0; 0)
for every ^ 2 (~; 0). Then, x(0) should be smaller than the allocation determined by
(17) for  = 0, which, though, is suboptimal from the teachers perspective. Hence, there
cannot exist a discontinuity at 0, nor at any other point for the same reason.
Therefore, under the conjecture that all types are screened perfectly, (17) uniquely
characterizes the optimal score schedule x for every  in . Next, we need to give a
condition when this conjecture is valid. It turns out that the su¢ cient condition is the
convexity of the score schedule x in (17).
Proposition 2 If the score schedule x dened in (17) is convex, then it is optimal for
the teacher to screen every student ability type  2  when solving problem (13)(16).
Proof. See Appendix C.
The idea of the proof is that, once the convexity condition is met, a grading rule
containing a uniform allocation for some types can be improved upon by separating
those types with distinct (and incentive-compatible) allocations as in (17). Furthermore,
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the convexity condition is equivalent to requiring the marginal disutility from e¤ort under
x as in (17) decrease in ability
@
@
(Cx(x(); )) < 0 (18)
or, under the functional assumption of C(x; ) = y(x)=;
yxx 
yx

2
;
which is to require that the e¤ort cost function be not too convex in scores x. (For
instance, this condition is met for the e¤ort cost function quadratic in x and, correspond-
ingly, for other cost functions less convexthan the quadratic one).
However, if the score schedule x dened in (17) is not convex everywhere, then at
the restrictions of the type space , where it is concave, we obtain pooling of types (by
reversing the argument in the proof of Proposition 2). Moreover, with a general form of
the teachers utility function V the condition for screening types is that the function
V

y 1

2 + 2
2

is convex in . With a concave (convex) utility function V , this condition holds, corre-
spondingly, less (more) often.
Given that the convexity condition holds, the nding that the teacher screens all
the student types when the student values grades for their signaling value and the job
market can observe the grading rule designed is in stark contrast to the results obtained
for the case with nominal grades, where pooling of most e¢ cient types is always optimal
(see Result 1 of the previous section). This di¤erence in the optimal grading rules results
from the di¤erence in the utility of a grade perceived by the student in the two models
studied. However, as we show next, if the job market cannot distinguish between grading
rules and relate the students grade to the grading rule applied, then we should again
observe coarse grading rules with pooling types even if the student values a grade for its
signaling value only.
4.2 Indistinguishable Grading Rules
Here, we study the situation when the job market does not observe the grading rulem in
particular, the grade schedule r ofm that the teacher has designed to grade her student.
(This could happen when there are too many teachers for the job market to distinguish
among.) Instead, we assume that the market holds its own perception about the grading
standard applied, which we denote by  2 C1r , and the students expected ability it infers
from a grade r is, accordingly, (r) dened by (11) for the grading standard  (i.e., in
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denition [11] r is replaced with ). The ability inferred, (r), also denes the students
value of a grade r. The assumption is that the grading standard  is public information.
4.2.1 The teachers problem
Now, the teachers problem is to design a grading rule m = fx; rg 2 C1x  C1r such that
it maximizes her expected utility against the grading standard 
Z 

x()dF () (19)
subject to
(r())  C(x(); )  (r(^))  C(x(^); ); (20)
(r())  C(x(); )  0; for all  and ^ in . (21)
Unlike in the previous problem (13)(15), here the teacher does not internalize the
e¤ect her grading rule m has on the students utility of a grade, , which is determined
by the job markets grading standard . In this respect, the problem is similar to the one
with nominal grades (3)(6), and, therefore, the solution method, applied in Appendix
A when solving the model with nominal grades, would apply here, too.
4.2.2 Consistent grading standard
The focus of the analysis presented below is on the properties of grading standard ,
which we require to be consistent with the optimal grade schedule r designed by the
teacher against the grading standard . First, we make the following denition.
Denition 1 Let a mapping  : C1r ! C1r map a grading standard  into the grade
schedule r of the grading rule m solving the teachers problem (19)(21) against the
grading standard .
For analytical convenience, we assume that for any  there is a unique solution to the
teachers problem and, accordingly, a unique grade schedule r. Now, we call a grading
standard  consistent if it is a xed point of the mapping :
 = ();
meaning that the grade schedule r of the teachers best-response grading rule m against
the grading standard  is equal to the grading standard  itself.
We can immediately claim the following.
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Proposition 3 A grading standard  with perfect screening of ability types cannot be
consistent.
This result is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 (and Result 1), where we show that
in a model with costless rewards pooling of types is inevitable. In the event that the job
market perceives a grading standard  that all student types are screened perfectly, i.e.,
(1) > (2) if 1 > 2; 1; 2 2 , the teachers problem (19)(21) becomes essentially
identical to that with nominal grades (3)(6), where the teacher can reward the student
with any ability signal  by manipulating the grade schedule r. More precisely, we can
make the following identity transformations of (19)(21) to make it look like (3)(6):
set ()  (r()) and introduce a constraint   ()   for all  2 . Then,
the teacher maximizes her expected utility with respect to fx;g, and the best-response
signal schedule  would pool types  in [; ], where  dened by (7) in Proposition 1,
for the reward of , implying that the grading standard  cannot be consistent.
Next, we show that there exists a consistent grading standard  a xed point
of . Consider a grading standard  such that
() =
(
r if   #;
r otherwise.
(22)
It says that the job market perceives that student types greater than or equal to some
# 2  get the grade r, others the grade r. Given the step grading standard  in
(22), the teacher becomes restricted to designing step grading rules m = fx; rg of the
form
x() =
(
x if   0;
x otherwise,
and r() =
(
r if   0;
r otherwise,
(23)
where the teachers choice variables are scores x, x and threshold type 
0. The question
is if there is a step grading standard  with threshold type # such that the threshold
type 0 of the step grading rule m = fx; rg solving (19)(21) is equal to the threshold
type # of the grading standard .
For a given threshold type 0, the optimal levels of scores x and x can be expressed
as the continuous functions of 0 from the binding IR and IC constraints, respectively.
Therefore, the teachers expected utility in (19) can be expressed as the continuous func-
tion of the threshold types 0 and # only, which we denote by W :  (; )! R (the
domain of # is set to be an open set, which later is expanded to ). Let
~ = arg max
02[;]
W (0; ) = !();
which characterize the teachers best-response threshold type ~ of the optimal grade
schedule r as a function of # of the grading standard . Now, the grading standard
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 is consistent if ~ = #, i.e., if # is a xed-point of the solution function ! (we have
assumed the uniqueness of the solution for every #, which is though irrelevant for the
following analysis).
By Berges Maximum Theorem, the solution function ! : (; ) !  is continuous
(because the function W is continuous and the constraint correspondence is compact-
valued and continuous: for any # the teachers choice set of 0 is the whole ability space
). The next step is to apply Brouwers Fixed Point Theorem, for which we need to
expand the domain of ! to . Dene function ~! : !  by
~!() = lim! !();
~!() = !(); 8 2 (; );
~!() = lim! !().
The function ~! is continuous, its domain  is compact and convex, hence by Brouwers
Fixed Point Theorem it has a xed point fp
fp = ~!(fp);
which characterizes the consistent grading rule  with # = fp. Having said that, we
establish the following
Proposition 4 There exists a consistent grading standard .
4.2.3 Dynamics of grading standards
Finally, within this modeling framework, we can iteratively analyze the dynamics of
grading standards, which we sketchily undertake here under the adaptive expectations
paradigm. To make a full-edged analysis of dynamic properties feasible would require
putting more structure on the model; instead, we restrict the analysis only to investigating
the direction of the change of the interval of ability types pooled for the highest grade.
Suppose the initial grading standard 0 2 C1r is given and let it be a strictly increasing
function of  with 0() = r (i.e., the job market initially perceives that the teacher screens
every student type). The resultant grade schedule r0, maximizing the teachers utility
against the grading standard 0, is given by r0 = (0). Suppose the grade schedule ri 1;
i  1, is given. We impose that the job market adjusts its perception of grading standards
by adapting the existing grade schedule as its new grading standard, i.e., i = ri 1, i  1.
Consider the grade schedule r0. It has the properties described in Proposition 1:
pooling types in [0; ], where 0 =  of Proposition 1, and screening the rest of types.
At iteration i = 1, the grading standard that the job market newly perceives is 1 = r0,
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which takes the form of
1() =
(
r if   0;
r0() otherwise.
Now, the highest reward that the teacher can o¤er the student against the grading stan-
dard 1 is 
1(r) where 1 is the (discontinuous) ability signal function dened by
(11) and it has depreciated compared with the highest reward available under 0.
Next, consider the grade schedule r1 = (1). One can show that the starting point
1 of the pooling interval [1; ] of the grade schedule r1 is characterized by
1  F (1)
f(1)
= 1
yx(x(
1))(x(1)  x(0))
y(x(1))  y(x(0)) ;
where the score allocation x(1) is designed for the types in the pooled interval [1; ] and
x(0) is the second-highest score allocation. The right-hand side of the above expression
is greater than 1 the second term of the product is greater than 1 (follows from the
Mean Value Theorem) implying that the starting point of the new pooling interval
1 is smaller than 0. Hence, after the initial iteration the pooling interval expands.
Furthermore, with the pooling interval expanded, the range of rewards ability signals
correspondingly shrinks.
To analyze tractably further change in pooling intervals [i; ], i  2, or to see if the
sequence fig is convergent or not, we would need to place more structure on the model,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. Arguably, with the range of rewards diminished,
the teacher is bound to apply more lenient grading rules in her attempt to extract more
e¤ort from lower types, for she is not anymore able to provide adequately high incentives
for higher types, leading to the gradual depreciation of grading standards in the end.
5 Discussion
Here, we discuss the main ndings of the models presented here. Signicantly, the grading
patterns obtained closely match those observed in practice lending credibility to our
modeling framework of a teacher-student relationship. In this light, we also argue that
our model(s) can be used for policy applications such as designing merit-pay programs
for teachers.
5.1 Main Findings
5.1.1 Compression of grades and grade ination
The results obtained here show that if there is a reason to think that the principal does not
pay for or internalize the cost of rewarding the agent, then in attempt to elicit on average
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more e¤ort the principal chooses to be more generous with rewards than otherwise she
would have been. In particular, the no distortion at the topproperty, generally observed
in models with costly transfers, does not hold here. Now, referring to our teacher-student
relationship studied, if an individual teacher cannot credibly commit to her using the
same grading standards the job market holds and the job market cannot distinguish
among individual grading rules applied, then we face the situation when the teacher
treats grades as costless rewards. As a result, the compression of grades or leniency
in grading turns out to be the utility-maximizing outcome of the teachers grading rule
optimally designed: it aims to extract more e¤ort from lower-ability students with the
help of costless good grades. To put it di¤erently, good grades are the commonsthat
teachers exploit to their benet. But as in all problems of the commons, we inevitably
obtain the deterioration of the commons, which, in our case, takes the form of grade
ination.
From our model(s) studied, we can distinguish two factors contributing toward grade
ination. First, teachers become more lenient with grading in response to shifts in dis-
tribution for student abilities toward the lower end of the ability space (Result 2 of this
paper). Second, if an individual teacher nds that her grading practice cannot a¤ect the
perception of the job market about the signaling value of grades, then the teacher tends
to overuse good grades (for whatever signaling value they carry along).
The two factors can both originate from the same source, namely, the expanding
availability of education (see, e.g., McKenzie & Tullock (1981)). Due to an increasing
number of educational institutions and study programs in recent decades, a larger number
of study places has been o¤ered, resulting in more lower-ability applicants being enrolled
(see, e.g., Wilson (1999)). Subsequently, this can lead to the emergence of the rst factor
discussed. Similarly, with more issuers of educational certicates, the grading standards
applied by every issuer or teacher become less identiable, resulting, correspondingly, in
the emergence of the second factor.12
5.1.2 Mismatch between grades and abilities
Our results obtained, in particular Result 2, can o¤er an explanation why teachers of
classes with less able students are more lenient in grading than others (see, e.g., Goldman
& Widawski (1976)). As we argue, this can be an outcome of the optimal design of
grading rules i.e., the expected-performance-maximizing outcome and not necessarily
an outcome of some teachers rent-seeking behavior, as sometimes is suggested (e.g.,
12The expanding availability of education was discussed as a circumstance of the grade ination phe-
nomenon in McKenzie & Tullock (1981). Their hypothesized link is in the context of the demand for
and supply of university openings: in response to a higher competition for students due to the in-
creasing number of university openings relative to the demand universities engaged in lowering grading
standards in order to attract more students. According to McKenzie & Tullock (1981), this practice
eventually led to grade ination.
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Johnson (1997)). In particular, our model (with nominal grades) predicts that in classes
with less able students grading rules are (optimally) designed so that high grades are more
easily attainable, resulting in a mismatch and low correlation between studentsgrades
and their abilities. For instance, if the population of mathematics students contains more
talented people than, say, the population of economics students, then we should observe
stricter grading standards applied in mathematics classes (as ample empirical evidence
shows to be the case, which is explored in the following section).
Concerning the normative side of the di¤erential grading standards discussed, there
have been a number of papers proposing grade adjustment mechanisms (see, e.g., Johnson
(1997)) in order to make grades more informative of studentsactual abilities. Without
going into the details of this literature, it is worth noting that there it is typically assumed
that the true reason for di¤erential grading standards lies with some personal features of
the instructor (e.g., the adaptation level, unwillingness to spend o¢ ce hours on dealing
with studentscomplaints about low grades, etc.). Therefore, proposed grade adjustment
mechanisms would attempt to correct for presumed instructor-specic factors failing to
recognize the possible endogeneity of those factors, which could lead a mechanism astray
from the projected goals.
5.2 Policy Applications
The modeling framework presented here can, arguably, be used to analyze the implications
of the introduction of merit-pay programs for teachers. In recent years, a number of
such programs have been introduced in various countries to foster incentives for teachers
in their endeavors to motivate more e¤ort from their students (see, Lavy (2002, 2009);
Atkinson et al. (2004); Lazear (2003)). Typically, these programs o¤er monetary bonuses
to teachers if their students improve upon their previous performance (as measured by
their scores achieved on standardized tests). The goals pursued by the developers of such
programs social planners range from improving average performance (in most cases)
to reducing the gap between poor and good performers (as, e.g., in the No Child Left
Behindinitiative in the US).
In terms of our modeling framework, the incentives set forth by merit-pay programs
for teachers can have a direct e¤ect on the form of the teachers utility function, V , in (1).
In the case of the No Child Left Behindprogram, where teachers are rewarded for a
reduction in the gap between poor and good performers, the utility function V could turn
concave since the teacher would start putting relatively more weight on the performance of
lower-ability students. Then, with a concave utility function V , the model with nominal
grades of Section 313 predicts that, compared with the case of linear utility, the gap
13This model is perhaps more appropriate for modeling grading patterns in high schools, for ability-
signaling concerns should be of a lesser magnitude among high-school students.
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between low- and high-ability students would diminish. However, this reduction would
come from two directions, namely, from the teachers demanding more e¤ort from low-
ability students and demanding less e¤ort from high-ability students.14 Hence, according
to the model, a negative externality from the introduction of this program can arise: high-
ability students can be made get the same grades but for less e¤ort. On the contrary,
the gap between poor and good performance increases, if the teachers utility function
turns convex as a result, for instance, of the social planner implementing a merit-pay
program that rewards for studentsexcellence only.
With the help our model(s), we can also o¤er an insight into the problem whether the
university administration should restrict the teacherschoice of grading rules by imposing
relative grading, i.e., grading on a curve. From the perspective of our model with relative
grades, when the job market observes the grading rule applied by the teacher, an optimal
grading rule is, actually, the one that perfectly screens student types. Then, imposing
grading on a curve would have no e¤ect since it were not binding. However, when the
job market does not observe grading rules, the teacher faces a commitment problem of
not overusing good grades, as we discussed before. In this event, grading on a curve
would actually bind and could possibly x the commitment problem of the teacher. But
then, the question is what goals the university administration pursues. If they coincide
with the teachers, i.e., maximizing student knowledge, then grading on a curve would
be a desirable policy. But if the administration aims to maximize the expected wage
of its students, assuming it is proportional to the ability signal inferred by the market,
then the administration may want, as argued in Chan et al. (2007) and Ostrovsky
& Schwarz (Forthcoming), to refrain from imposing grading on a curve and rather have
grades compressed in order to disclose information about student abilities only coarsely.15
14With the concave utility function V , the optimal score allocations ~x() for  in [; ) are equal to
~x() = y 1x

f()2Vx [~x()] yx [~x(
)]
f()2Vx [~x()]

:
From this, we can immediately observe that it has to be the case that ~x() < x(), where x() is
the pooling-interval e¤ort level of the linear-utility case. This is so because the ratio Vx [~x()] =Vx [~x(
)]
is strictly greater than 1, and if ~x()  x() then the whole score allocation schedule ~x is above the
allocation schedule x of the linear case. But it is not possible because ~x would be the solution to the
teachers problem in the linear case, not x. Then, the ratio (Vx [~x()] yx [~x(
)])=Vx [~x()] needs to be
greater than yx [x(
)] at least for some  in [; ), otherwise the score allocation of the linear case would
do better than ~x. Hence, if for some  ~x() > x(); so it is for  = . All in all, we have a reduction in
the gap between the highest and lowest performances, but this reduction comes from both directions.
15For more discussion on and empirical implications of making academic transcripts more informative,
see Bar et al. (2009).
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6 Empirical Evidence
Here we present empirical evidence in support of our Result 2 the lower the expectations
the teacher holds about her studentsabilities, the more lenient the grading rule she sets
up.
In general, to test this theoretical prediction of the model, one would need university
data such as student grades and their ability proxy (like their performance on university
entry exams or Scholastic Aptitude Test [SAT] scores). Then, roughly speaking, one
would compare grading patterns for classes with di¤erent student ability distributions
and see if the prediction holds. However, there have been a number of empirical studies
of the kind in the special literature of educational measurement (e.g., in academic period-
icals such as the Journal of Educational Measurement or Educational and Psychological
Measurement). Most importantly, those studies without exception report results that are
fully in line with the models predictions: elds with lower ability students studied as
compared with those with higher ability students employ less stringent grading criteria.
Even though many of those studies are comprehensive in empirical matters, they lack
any rigorous theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. Their explanations mainly
hinge on intuition or reference to similar phenomena from the adaptation-level theory
in psychological literature. In what follows, we attempt to review in detail some of the
empirical studies comparing grading standards over time and in di¤erent elds, and to
show that our model proves helpful in explaining the empirical evidence observed.
Aiken (1963) is one of the rst empirical studies that suggest that grading behavior is
dictated by the quality of students in the current class and not by some absolute invariant
standards. Aiken (1963) presents time-series evidence from the Womans College of the
University of North Carolina that could imply that, with more able students in a class
(as measured by their SAT scores and high-school rankings), teachers tend to apply
more stringent grading standards. As for the theoretical explanation for this nding, the
study only briey mentions that it conforms to the adaptation-level theory or central
tendency phenomenon, which basically concerns the tendency of supervisors to evaluate
the performance of people supervised in relative terms rather than in absolute ones.
A much more comprehensive study Goldman &Widawski (1976) rst notes the weak-
nesses of previous studies on grading patterns because of their using the total grade point
average (GPA) as the criterion of grading standards. As they rightly argue, GPAs are not
perfectly comparable either over time or among individual students because of the possi-
bly di¤erent composition of courses included to compute grade averages. To remedy that,
Goldman & Widawski (1976) employ a between-subjects design aimed at making grade
comparisons more e¤ective. They compute an index of grading standards using pairwise
comparisons of grades in 17 major elds at the University of California, Riverside, from
a random sample of 475 students. In particular, they perform the comparison of grading
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standards in one class (say, psychology) against those in another class (say, biology) by
computing the di¤erence in average grades of only those students who took both classes.
After obtaining di¤erentials in grading standards between any two classes (from the 17
classes available in their study), they construct an index of grading standards for each
class, which is an average of all the di¤erentials between that particular class and the rest
of the classes. Finally, they correlate the computed indices of grading standards with the
average scores on the verbal and mathematical portions of the SAT test and high-school
GPAs (i.e., student ability proxies) of all the students majoring in those 17 classes. The
main empirical nding in Goldman & Widawski (1976) is that the constructed index of
grading standards correlates highly in a negative direction with student ability proxies.
In other words, they conclude that professors in a eld containing more able students
tend to grade more stringently than do professors in elds with lower ability students.
As a result, they nd that the past performance and abilities of students account for
only slightly more than 50 percent of the variance in grades, and suggest introducing
some grade adjustment mechanism to make grades more informative of students true
abilities. Again, in giving an explanation for the empirical results obtained, they restrict
their argument simply by making a reference to the adaptation-level theory that people
are judged in comparison to their peers.
A similar study Goldman & Hewitt (1975), which along with presenting the empir-
ical results (which draw the same conclusions about grading behavior as in the studies
mentioned above), also provides a more elaborate theoretical explanation for the results
obtained. The authors think that the antecedents (e.g., student ability levels, work
habits, etc.) and consequences (grading standards) of college grading are inextricably
tied together by a personal characteristic of college instructors. This characteristic is
the phenomenon of adaptation level, and it is so pervasive among college instructors and
perhaps people in general, Goldman & Hewitt (1975) continue, as to be considered an al-
most inevitable factor in the college grading process. Consequently, through that personal
characteristic link, grading standards would be partly determined by the ability level of
the student population. However, along the lines of our model developed above, this
personal characteristic, as envisaged by Goldman & Hewitt (1975), is not some intrinsic
feature of human behavior but rather the outcome of optimal behavior.
A decade later, Strenta & Elliott (1987) replicated the study of Goldman &Widawski
(1976) using data from a di¤erent institution, Dartmouth College, just to nd that the
di¤erential grading standards exist in the same magnitude and in roughly the same or-
der. Therefore, Strenta & Elliott (1987) argue that it remains the case that students
with higher SAT scores tend to major in elds with more rigorous grading standards,
and that factors attracting more talented students result in their being graded harder.
(However, we would argue for the reverse direction of causation: since some elds attract
more talented students, professors in those elds will grade their students more strin-
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gently, which is optimal in order to extract more e¤ort.) As in previous studies, Strenta
& Elliott (1987) argue that these di¤erential grading standards serve to attenuate the
correlation between the GPAs and SAT scores of the students, and they also show that
the correlation increases sizably if GPAs are adjusted by accounting for di¤erences in
departmental grading standards. Finally, a similar study conducted at Duke Univer-
sity (Johnson (2003)) conrmed the conclusions about systematic di¤erences in grading
standards from the previous studies.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a teacher-student relationship as a special type of an agency
problem featuring costless rewards. Our theoretical predictions o¤er a good match to
grading patterns empirically observed both from the static and dynamic perspectives.
This allows us to suggest the chosen framework of a principal-agent model is appropriate
to analyze a teacher-student relationship.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Here, we solve the teachers utility maximization problem (3)(6), namely, we look for
the grading rule fx; rg 2 C1x  C1r that maximizes (3) subject to (4)(6). To start with,
we make the following conjecture.
Conjecture 2 In the solution to (3)(6), all types are perfectly screened.
To put it di¤erently, we conjecture that the allocation schedules x and r are strictly
increasing in type .
As it is standard, if fx; rg is optimal, then it has to be a boundary solution, where
the individual rationality constraint of the lowest type is binding
U(; ) = 0;
and the utility levels for the rest of types  2 (; ], as can be expressed from the incentive
compatibility constraints, are equal to
U(; ) =  
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~: (24)
Next, we observe that since grades are costless for the teacher to reward, it must be that
r() = r. This observation allows us to obtain from the above expression for the utility
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level of the highest type  = 
r   C(x();) +
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~ = 0; (25)
which eliminates the grade schedule from the maximization problem and combines all the
constraints into one (because if it is satised, so are all the other constraints by choosing
the rightgrade schedule).
Having reduced the initial problem, next we set up the Lagrangean, which is
L(x; ) =
Z 

x()f()d() + [r   C(x();) +
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~]:
The rst-order conditions (FOCs) are
f() + [ Cx(x();) + Cx(x();)] = 0 (26)
with respect to allocation x(), and
f() + Cx(x();) = 0: (27)
with respect to allocations x();  2 [; ). These FOCs together with reduced constraint
(25) should characterize the optimal score schedule x.
However, if we combine through the Lagrange multiplier  the rst-order condition
(26) with (27), we get
f()
f()
=
Cx(x();)  Cx(x();)
 Cx(x();) ;
which should hold for any type . But if we take the limit  !  on both sides, we nd
that the left-hand side converges to 1, while the right-hand side  to something strictly
greater than one:
Cx(x();)
 Cx(lim! x();)
+
Cx(x();)
Cx(lim! x();)
 Cx(x();) Cx(lim! x();)
+ 1 > 1:
Hence, there cannot exist a strictly monotonous score schedule x that satises the rst-
order conditions and constraint (25). In other words, there is no shadow price  that can
balance all the incentives when screening all the types. Therefore, Conjecture 2 cannot
hold, and, in particular, it is not valid at the topof the ability space.
Instead, we proceed by pooling types  which are subject to the uniform allocation
with the highest grade of r. Let  denote the starting value of the pooling interval [; ].
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After following the same steps as before, the Lagrangean now takes the form of
L(x; ) =
Z 

x()f()d() + (1  F ())x() + [r  C(x();) +
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~]:
The FOCs are
f() + (1  F ()) + ( Cx(x();) + Cx(x();)) = 0 (28)
with respect to allocation x(), and, as before,
f() + Cx(x();) = 0 (29)
with respect to allocations x();  2 [; ). Combining the two conditions, we get
f() + (1  F ())
f()
=
Cx(x(
);)  Cx(x();)
 Cx(x();) :
Before deriving the condition for the starting point of the pooling interval , we make
the following observation. In the solution, the score schedule x needs to be continuous
at the starting point of the pooling interval. If it were not, then the reward schedule r
would also be discontinuous (otherwise, the grading rule would not be incentive compat-
ible). But since grades are costless for the teacher, then at no cost she can improve her
utility by tilting up the segment of score allocations to the left from the discontinuity
point and accordingly adjusting the grade allocations to meet the incentive compatibility
constraints. Hence, the score schedule x cannot be discontinuous at the starting point of
the pooling interval.
Taking the limit  !  on both sides and using the continuity of x at  we get the
condition for the starting point of the pooling interval [; ] :
1  F ()
f()
=
Cx(x(
);)
 Cx(x();) ;
or, given our assumption that the e¤ort cost function C is separable in score and type,
C(x; ) = y(x)=, this condition becomes
1  F ()
f()
= : (30)
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Since there may be no type  in

; 

for which condition (30) holds16, then the starting
value of the pooling at the topinterval is dened as
 = minf : (1  F ())=(f())  1;  2 g; (31)
which is (7) in Proposition 1. Note that the expression (1 F ())=(f()) is monotonically
decreasing in  due to the monotone hazard rate assumption so that the pooling-interval
starting point  is uniquely determined.
Suppose that  > . Denote the score-grade allocation for every type  in

; 

by
(x(); r), where the score allocation x() needs still to be determined. From (28) and
(30) we express the Lagrange multiplier  to be equal to
 =
f()2
yx(x(
))
: (32)
Plugging the above expression for  into remaining rst-order conditions (29), we get
that for every  in [; ) the optimal score allocation x() is equal to
x() = y 1x

f()2yx(x(
))
f()2

; (33)
which is (8) in Proposition 1.
Finally, the highest score allocation, x(), can be determined from the constraint
r   C(x(); ) +
Z 

C(x(); )d = 0; (34)
after plugging in the expression for x() from (33), giving (10) in Proposition 2.
The constraint that the schedule of performance allocations x be non-decreasing is
met, which follows from (30) and the monotone hazard rate assumption.17
The optimal grade allocations r() for  in [; ) are found from (24) and are equal
to
r() = C(x(); ) 
Z 

C(x(~); ~)d~; (35)
which is (9) in Proposition 1, concluding the solution to the optimization problem (3)(6).
16The pooling interval comprises the whole type space if, for instance, student types  are uniformly
distributed with   =2.
17From equation (30) it follows that f()=(1   F ()) < 1 for  in [; ), and from the monotone
hazard rate: f 0() >  f2()=(1   F ()). The two properties ensure that the derivative of (33), @x=@,
is positive.
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Appendix B. Proof of Result 2
With reference to the pooling-interval condition (7), dene gi() = (1   Fi())=(fi()),
and let i = minf : gi()  1;  2 g, i = 1; 2. Since the likelihood ratio order implies
the hazard rate order (see Shaked & Shanthikumar (1994)), which is f1()=(1 F1()) 
f2()(1 F2()) for every , it immediately follows that g1()  g2(), leading to 1  2.
Hence, we have r2() = r  r1() for  2

2; 

.
Next, consider the score allocations xi(), i = 1; 2, for types  in [; 

2). Denote
the Lagrange multipliers from the two optimization problems by 1 and 2, dened by
(32) of Appendix A, respectively. Divide the rst-order conditions for x1 and x2 (29) of
Appendix A to obtain for any  in [; 2)
yx(x2())
yx(x1())
=
1
2
f2()
f1()
;
which also holds at  = 2 by the continuity of the score schedule x2 at  = 

2 as argued
in Appendix A.
Since the highest score x2(

2) in the second class must be at least as large as x1(

2),
which stems from the second teachers incentive to expand the pooling interval even
further (otherwise the score schedule could be improved upon by tilting it up), then at
 = 2 the left-hand side of the above expression is greater than or equal to 1, and so
is the right-hand side. Due to the decreasing likelihood ratio f2=f1, the right-hand side
stays greater than 1 for any  in [; 2), and so does the left-hand side, implying that
x2()  x1() for every  in [; 2), which subsequently leads to r2()  r1() from (9) in
Proposition 1.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
Dene the teachers expected utility V : C1x ! R from implementing a score schedule x
by
V(x) =
Z 

x()f()d:
Let the score schedule x with the grade schedule r imposed by (16) solve the teachers
problem (13)(15) and suppose that there is a non-empty pooling interval [0; 00] at which
x() = x0 and r() = r0 (the arguments below are also valid if we consider a half-open or
open pooling interval). We need to consider two cases 1) 0 =  and 2) 0 > , and in each
case it is su¢ cient to restrict attention to those performance allocations that satisfy the
optimality conditions: the binding individual rationality constraint of the lowest-ability
type and the set of downward-binding incentive compatibility constraints, respectively.
In the rst case, 1) 0 = , the score allocation x() = x0 with grade r0 for all 
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in [; 00] need to satisfy the binding individual rationality constraint of the lowest-ability
type:
r(r0)  y(x
0)

= 0;
or
x0 = y 1[r(r0)];
where the function y 1 is the inverse of y and r is the ability type inferred as dened by
(11). The teachers expected utility from implementing the score schedule x is given by
V(x) = F (00)y 1[r(r0)] +
Z 
00
x()f()d:
As an alternative to the score schedule x, consider the following score schedule x^ :
for  in [; 00] set (distinct and incentive compatible) performance allocations x^() =
y 1[(2 + 2)=2], as in (17), and for  in (00; ]  x^() = x(). The case of interest is
the situation when the monotonicity of the new score schedule x^ is preserved. Otherwise,
when the monotonicity not preserved, i.e., if x^(00) > x^() = x() for some  > 00, the
teacher can increase her expected utility by simply setting x^() = x^(00) for all  > 00
such that x^() < x^(00) and leave the remaining allocations intact. The teachers expected
utility from implementing the score schedule x^ is equal to
V(x^) =
Z 00

x^()f()d +
Z 
00
x()f()d:
The second terms of V(x) and V(x^) are identical, and so any di¤erence in the utilities
needs to come from the di¤erence in the rst terms. Since the suggested performance
allocation schedule x^ is convex on the restriction [; 00] from the condition of Proposition
2 then by Jensens inequalityZ 00

x^()f()d()  F (00)x^(
Z 00

f()d()=F (00)) = F (00)x^(r(r0))
= F (00)y 1[(r(r0)2 + 2)=2] > F (00)y 1(r(r0));
which is equal to the rst term of V(x), and where the last inequality stems from the
fact that the arithmetic average is greater than the geometric one and y 1 is strictly
increasing.
Hence, instead of pooling ability types at the bottom the teacher can do better by
screening them since V(x^) > V(x).
In the second case, 0 > , the allocation x() = x0 for all  in [0; 00] together
with grade r0 need to satisfy the downward binding incentive compatibility constraint of
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the ability type 0, which can be expressed as
r(r0)  y(x
0)
0
= r(r00)  y(x
00)
0
;
where the allocation (x00; r00) is the best alternative to type 0. Since the teacher screens
the types in [; 0) and the optimal way of doing it is as in (17) otherwise, the score
schedule x is not optimal then the score allocation x00 = sup<0 x
() = y 1[(02+2)=2]
and the ability signal r(r00) = sup<0  = 
0. The score allocation x0 can, accordingly,
be expressed as
x0 = y 1

0r(r0)  
02   2
2

;
and the resulting expected utility to the teacher from implementing the grading rule x
is equal to
V(x) =
Z 0

x()f()d + (F (00)  F (0))x0 +
Z 
00
x()f()d:
Similarly to the previous case, consider the following grading rule x^ : for  in [0; 00] set
performance allocations x^() = y 1[(2+2)=2] and for  in [; 0)[(00; ]  x^() = x().
(The monotonicity of the grading rule x^ is preserved on the restriction [; 00] by the
construction of x^() for  in [0; 00], and regarding the monotonicity over (00; ] the same
argument as in the rst case studied above applies.) The teachers expected utility from
implementing x^ is equal to
V(x^) =
Z 0

x()f()d +
Z 00
0
x^()dF () +
Z 
00
x()f()d:
Given the condition that x^() is convex for  in [0; 00], by Jensens inequality we have
for the second term of V(x^) thatZ 00
0
x^()dF ()  (F (00)  F (0))x^(r(r0)) =
= (F (00)  F (0))y 1[(r(r0)2 + 2)=2] >
> (F (00)  F (0))y 1[0r(r0)  (02   2)=2];
which is the second term of V(x), and where the last inequality stems from the fact
that r(r0) > 0 and y 1 is strictly increasing. From this derivation, we have again that
V(x^) > V(x), which concludes the proof of Proposition 2 that pooling student types
cannot be optimal for the teacher.
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